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Iraq, unilateralism and its discontents 
 
At its Centennial meeting in 2006 the American Society of International Law 
(ASIL) took the rare step of adopting a resolution expressing what ASIL press 
releases – though not the text itself – described as ‘the deep concern of many 
                                                
1 This paper is taken from a longer talk I gave at the 21st Helsinki Summer Seminar on 
International Law in August 2008, entitled ‘Pollution, Power and International Law’. I am very 
grateful to the organisers for inviting me, and to the students for their stimulating responses. For 
their invaluable input to drafts of this essay, I am indebted to Brenna Bhandar, Bill Bowring, 
Brian Concannon, Peter Hallward, Vishaal Kishore, Rob Knox and Susan Marks, as well as to the 
participants of the ‘Law, Colonialism and Violence II’ workshop at the Altonaer Stiftung für 
philosophische Grundlagenforschung in Hamburg, 9–11 May 2008, and the Critical Legal 
Conference in Glasgow, 5–7 September 2008. Responsibility for all arguments and errors is, of 
course, mine.  
ASIL members’ with regard to recent US behaviour and actions.2 As a ‘partisan’ 
move, this was not uncontroversial in the field. The resolution’s actual wording 
was quite anaemic, and refrained even from mentioning the US. The fact that a 
general statement of well-known norms was widely understood to be a rebuke to 
the Bush government reflects the common tendency to conceive not just this or 
that particular rule, but the whole edifice of international law (IL) itself as in 
fundamental structural opposition to the Republican administration’s agenda. The 
hoopla within IL that the resolution generated, and the repeated insistence that 
(its milquetoast specifics notwithstanding) it was ‘historic’, illustrate the unusual 
current prominence of IL in contemporary debates, and a self-consciousness about 
that prominence among its scholars.3  
  
It has been pointed out more than once that in recent years, IL has ‘become 
important politically, intellectually, and culturally’.4 Books on IL make bestseller 
lists; international legal opinions battle it out in the pages of mass-market 
                                                
2 ASIL, ‘Resolution Adopted’, <www.asil.org/events/am06/resolutions.html> (visited 6 January 
2009).  
3 For discussions of the importance of and controversy around the resolution, see, for example, 
Roger Alford, ‘ASIL Passes Historic Resolution’, <opiniojuris.org/2006/03/31/asil-passes-
historic-resolution/> (visited 6 January 2009); José E. Alvarez, ‘Lessons From a Resolution’, 
<www.asil.org/ilpost/president/pres060518.html> (visited 6 January 2009); ‘ASIL 100th Annual 
Meeting Breaks Records and Makes News’ (pdf) 
<www.asil.org/events/am06/ann%20mtg%20resolution%2006.04.05.pdf> (visited 6 January 2009). 
4 Samuel Estreicher and Paul B. Stephan, ‘Taking International Law Seriously’, 44 Virginia 
Journal of International Law (2003) 1–4 at 1.  
newspapers, on television and radio.5 This journey into the mainstream was 
discernable before the ‘Global War on Terror’, in part in response to the 
jurisprudentially troublesome Kosovo invasion of 1999,6 but it has accelerated 
exponentially since 2001. 
 
Key to this new interest in IL, of course, has been the extreme unpopularity of the 
Iraq War, and of a Bush administration that, it is agreed by most observers, broke 
IL to prosecute the former.7 Two things are clear. First, most of the excoriation of 
the war as illegal is politico-moral opposition translated into juridical categories: 
IL is here a vocabulary for expressing political opposition, predicated on a 
generally untheorized equation of legality and justice. This collapse of categories 
must be resisted, and the equation either systematically justified, or rejected, by 
critical jurisprudence.  
 
Second, in this model whatever victory IL has won in framing terms of political 
debate is Pyrrhic: IL enters dominant discourse as and indeed because the Iraq 
war and other recent actions are seen to undermine it. IL has, in this version of 
events, become mainstream because it is in crisis. The more it ails, the more visible 
it becomes.  
                                                
5 See for example Philippe Sands, Lawless World, (Penguin: London, 2006). Also see the 
appearance of Jack Goldsmith on The Daily Show, 16 April 2008, Comedy Central.  
6 See for example Paul Virilio, Strategy of Deception (Verso: London, 2000) for an overview of the 
sense of juridical chaos around the war. 
7 I have argued this in China Miéville, ‘Anxiety and the Sidekick State: British International Law 
After Iraq’, 46 Harvard International Law Journal (2005) 441–58. 
 Exemplified in the title of Philippe Sands’s recent book, the widespread concern is 
that we have been tugged towards a ‘lawless world’ by a band of, depending on 
one’s perspective, insane/messianic/ruthless/misguided neoconservative 
ideologues, whose strategy of aggressive unilateralism goes hand-in-hand with 
international legal nihilism. Up to a point this impression is not unreasonable: it 
takes at face value the swaggering pronouncements of some of neoconservatism’s 
best-known figures. When Richard Perle, for example, insisted in 2003 that the 
Iraq War was illegal but that ‘in this case international law stood in the way of 
doing the right thing’,8 the lines seemed clear. Even more overtly combative and 
nationalist was John Bolton’s refusal to ‘grant any validity to international law’ 
because ‘those who think that international law really means anything are those 
who want to constrict the United States’.9 The agon against IL reached a 
pantomime extreme with Donald Rumsfeld’s lumping together, in the 2005 
National Defense Strategy document, of IL and terrorism: ‘Our strength as a 
nation state will continue to be challenged by those who employ a strategy of the 
weak using international fora, judicial processes, and terrorism’.10  
                                                
8 Oliver Burkeman and Julian Borger, ‘War critics astonished as US hawk admits invasion was 
illegal’, The Guardian, 20 November 2003. Available at 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2003/nov/20/usa.iraq1> (visited 19 April 2009). 
9 Quoted in Samantha Power, ‘Boltonism’, New Yorker, 21 March 2005. Available at 
<http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/03/21/050321ta_talk_power> (visited 19 April 2009). 
10 The National Defense Strategy of The United States of America, 
<www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/nds-usa_mar2005_ib.htm> (visited 6 January 
2009). 
 Such ostentatious legal nihilism (which in fact comprises two distinct if often 
overlapping attitudes to IL, it will be argued) has clearly been used to serve the 
neoconservative agenda and strategy that have been corollaries of a particular 
analysis of US strength.11 To oppose that agenda through IL, then, may appear to 
be nothing other than the taking seriously of the neoconservatives’ claims – that 
IL is their enemy. 
 
In fact, however, such pronouncements as Perle’s and Bolton’s represented only 
one wing of the (never monolithic) neoconservative movement. There has always 
been another that, far from dismissing it, takes IL seriously, and has for some 
years been developing a well-researched and meticulous body of jurisprudence 
revolving around the relationship between IL and ‘imperial sovereignty’, as Lorite 
Escorihuela has shown in a careful taxonomy of what he calls ‘Nationalist 
International Law’ (NIL).12 Nor has this law developed in a vacuum. Lisa Hajjar 
has, in terming this trend the ‘Israelization’ of international law, given it a name 
that stresses an important element of its juridico-strategic antecedents: the 
specifically non-IL-nihilist unilateralism of some Israeli IL scholars, an approach 
that ‘does not make international law irrelevant, contrary to the claims of eulogists 
and critics alike’, but that engages with it ‘very seriously’ based on the principle 
                                                
11 See Alex Callinicos, The New Mandarins of American Power (Polity Press: Cambridge, 2003), for 
a good overview of this perspective in its ‘haute’ phase. 
12 Alejandro Lorite Escorihuela, ‘Cultural Relativism the American Way: The Nationalist School 
of International Law in the United States’, 5 Global Jurist Frontiers (2005) 1–166, at 1. 
that so-called ‘absolute security is a legal right of the state’.13 Such jurisprudence 
has been important to the development of NIL. At its most provocative, some 
neoconservative scholarship has even claimed that unilateral US action is the best 
hope to save IL itself, as in Mario Loyola’s assertion that ‘[t]he United Nations is 
in a sense systematically destroying international law’,14 or Bush’s claim that the 
‘Iraq war saved the UN’.15 
 
Among the US neoconservative ranks, for every Richard Perle there is a Beaver, a 
Bybee, a Rivkin, a John Yoo, eruditely justifying neoconservative policy in legal 
terms. Just as Hajjar notes how ‘highly sophisticated’ much of the deployment of 
IL from the right is, so Lorite Escorihuela shows the seriousness and erudition of 
                                                
13 Lisa Hajjar, ‘From Nuremburg to Guantanamo: International Law and American Power 
Politics’, 229 Middle East Report (2003). Available at 
<http://www.merip.org/mer/mer229/229_hajjar.html> (visited 19 April 2009). 
14 Mario Loyola, ‘Mend It or End It’, 10 Weekly Standard (2004). Available at 
<http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/028paljb.asp?pg=1> 
(visited 19 April 2009). I am indebted to Rob Knox for this point, and for his argument that 
Republican Presidential Candidate John McCain’s support for ‘upholding and strengthening 
international law’ through the establishment of a ‘League of Democracies’ that might bypass the 
UN to ‘form the core of an international order of peace’ is a recent iteration of this tendency. See 
John McCain, ‘Remarks by Senator John McCain at the Hoover Institute’, 
<mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressOffice.Speeches&ContentRecord_id=c35
d4437-81d8-441f-ad42-71bea309a6be&Region_id=&Issue_id=73379446-ed00-4a32-8ef1-
9f1e12737746> (visited 6 January 2009). 
15 Ewan MacAskill, ‘Iraq war saved the UN, says president’, The Guardian, 20 November 2003. 
Available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2003/nov/20/usa.iraq> (visited 19 April 2009). 
Yoo’s work, and insists that many of NIL’s claims are ‘neither outlandish nor 
outrageous for international law … [but are] perfectly understandable, and a 
picture on the basis of which people can agree to disagree’.16 However, liberal and 
left critics of NIL have tended to seek comfort in dismissing any such work as so 
‘replete with basic errors’, in Sands’ phrase, that it needs no engagement with, 
insisting that anyone with ‘the most rudimentary understanding of international 
law’ will immediately know it to be ‘deeply flawed’.17 
 
If that were true, what would be the point of NIL claims? In this liberal model, 
neoconservative recourse to IL, where it exists, tends to be perceived as a mere 
veneer, a rhetorical gloss. Hence the claim that Yoo is ‘justifying the commission 
of a crime using false legal rhetoric’, and the lament that he and his cohorts 
illustrate that ‘in practice, “international law” exists as a justifying instrument for 
powerful countries to impose their will on those which are less powerful’.18 This is 
obviously not wholly false: there is no dispute that IL has – among others – an 
ideological function. But the idea that NIL is ‘merely’ ideology is usually made by 
those horrified by what they see as the ‘undermining’, ‘failure’ or even ‘death’ of IL 
because of widespread unconscionable actions, and/or the obvious ‘basic errors’ of 
the supposed justifications. Peculiarly, then, they perceive the deployment of IL to 
                                                
16 Lorite Escorihuela, ‘Cultural Relativism’, supra note 12, at 100. 
17 Sands, Lawless, supra note 5, 213, 214.  
18 Michael Ratner, quoted in Marjorie Cohn, ‘Torture of “enemy combatants”: call for dismissal 
and prosecution of John Yoo’, <www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=8710> (visited 
6 January 2009), and Glenn Greenwald, ‘John Yoo’s war crimes’, 
<www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2008/04/02/yoo/> (visited 6 January 2009). 
be ideology insofar as it is failing as ideology: they explain it as legitimation in 
claiming that it legitimates nothing. If that is NIL’s main purpose, or one of 
them, it is hard to see why so inefficient a tool would be used.19 
 
In addition, this despairing liberal Ideologiekritik ignores the extent to which IL-
nihilism, just as much as IL’s fervent citation, is ideological. Rumsfeld’s, Perle’s 
and Bolton’s pronouncements against IL were, among other things, attempts to 
mobilise an aggressively nationalist and, crucially, triumphalist section of the 
neoconservative base. The ideological function of the ostentatious claim to be, 
perhaps not so precisely breaking as exceeding the law, has been neglected.20  
 
However, such a strategy relies on success, and recently all has not been going 
according to plan. The US ruling elite has been split on strategy, and the decline 
in support for the war has been a real problem for the neoconservative agenda, as 
illustrated by Republican infighting, the forced departure of Rumsfeld in 2006, 
the administration’s distancing of itself from some Yoo-isms for a putatively 
kinder, gentler neoconservatism, and of course ultimately the election of Barack 
Obama. Epitaphs for the movement, including from those previously loyal to it, 
                                                
19 Again without denying an ideological function to IL, I have argued in more detail against the 
privileging of this element at the expense of attention to the ineluctable and constitutive 
juridicalization of modernity, the generalization of the legal form and the coercive material power 
of IL, in China Miéville, Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of International Law, (Brill: 
Leiden, 2005) 80–84. 
20 An important exception is Nathanial Berman, ‘Legitimacy through Defiance: From Goa to 
Iraq’, 23 Wisconsin International Law Journal (2005), 93–125. 
have become common.21 As triumphalism has ebbed, with the fortunes of war, so 
has the ostentatious denunciation of IL associated with bullish early 
neoconservatism.22  
 
In some administration quarters, even before the election of 2008 the tone had 
shifted even beyond of the NIL that always existed alongside the nihilists. Now in 
place of, or at least alongside, the braggadocio of Bolton or the arid and sinister 
managerialism of Yoo there are, for example, the gentlemanly and rather brilliant 
interventions of John Bellinger, Legal Adviser to the US Secretary of State. In an 
important 2007 speech in The Hague, Bellinger systematically and powerfully 
counters the charges that the US does not care about or abide by IL. In a move 
rather startling to those for whom the view that IL is fundamentally 
indeterminate is generally evidence of a critical and politically progressive 
approach to IL,23 in the unusually nuanced way he counters the administration’s 
legal critics, Bellinger seems not only almost to acknowledge such indeterminacy, 
                                                
21 See for example Francis Fukuyama, After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads (Profile Books: 
London, 2006); and Kenneth Anderson, ‘Goodbye to All That? A Requiem for Neoconservatism’, 
22 American University International Law Review (2007), 277. 
22 Russia’s recent crushing of US ally Georgia’s aspirations has meant further jeremiads from 
neoconservative quarters, as well as what some commentators have sardonically depicted as a 
renewed and hypocritical support for ‘traditional’ IL. See Robert Parry, ‘Neocons Now Love 
International Law’, <www.consortiumnews.com/2008/081108b.html> (visited 6 January 2009). 
23 See of course especially Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia (Lakimiesliiton Kustannus: 
Helsinki, 1989). I have attempted to integrate the indeterminacy thesis, as expounded by 
Koskenniemi, into a Marxist approach to IL in Miéville, Between, supra note 19. 
but to affably and strategically deploy it for the US state. ‘[O]ur critics often assert 
the law as they wish it were, rather than as it actually exists today. This leads to 
claims that we violate international law – when we have simply not reached the 
result or interpretation that these critics prefer’.24 
 
No matter how one might excoriate the politics that animates them, these are 
hardly the crude theses that Sands – unconvincingly – ascribes to Yoo and others. 
Bellinger in fact turns such a Sands-ite critique of self-evident basic error against 
the liberals who level it. For example, in responding to a UN report on the 
detention camps at Guantánamo Bay, he explains: ‘[w]e think that the report is 
fundamentally flawed in its procedures and is riddled with inaccuracies and really 
was done in a way, frankly, that discredits the report overall and the work of the 
rapporteurs in this effort.’25 Here, Bellinger is a reasonable man – more reasonable 
indeed than Sands, whose rage at Yoo is too urgent for clauses: ‘Simplistic. 
Unilateral. Misconceived. Poorly presented. Rushed.’26 Bellinger by contrast 
speaks more in sorrow than in anger, regretfully forced to speak out for the sake of 
the honour, let us be clear, of the UN, whose rapporteurs disgrace themselves with 
such shoddy work. 
 
                                                
24 John B. Bellinger, ‘The United States and International Law’, 
<www.state.gov/s/l/rls/86123.htm> (visited 6 January 2009).  
25 Quoted in Steven Donald Smith, ‘Guantanamo Detainees Being Held Legally, Official Says’, 
<www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=14844> (visited 6 January 2009). 
26 Sands, Lawless, supra note 5, 227 
The failure of many liberal critics to take seriously the jurisprudential virtuosity of 
their opponents is predicated on an attempt to defend IL against (supposedly self-
evident, and self-evidently inadequate) attacks. Some left and critical scholarship 
has taken a structurally similar approach – and is, therefore, despite its superiority 
to untheorized liberal nostrums, open to similar critiques – counterposing IL and 
the neoconservative agenda. Its most impressive iteration is Bill Bowring’s 
important and erudite recent work on ‘the degradation of the international legal 
order’, according to which the Iraq War is ‘blatantly unlawful’.27 Alas, the most 
serious neoconservative work illustrates that there is no such blatancy about the 
legal case. 
 
For other radical scholars, sceptical of that ‘international legal order’ and 
suspicious of ‘the rule of law’, such a defence of ‘legality’ may be hard to sign up 
to. Neoconservatism, though, has traumatised the critical left as much as it has 
liberalism, and in response, strategies have emerged to combine fidelity to critical 
theories of law with juridical attacks on empire.  
 
One has been a kind of temporary loyalty to law in the face of seeming exigency, 
and is thus similarly predicated on the law-versus-neoconservatism paradigm I 
have argued is misleading. ‘[W]ith key figures in the US administration so 
apparently cynical about international law … didn’t law really need 
                                                
27 Bill Bowring, The Degradation of the International Legal Order? (Routledge: London, 2008), 1. 
Emphasis added. 
championing?’28 But in the subordination of critique to a legalism in which they 
have fundamental doubts, the strategy has been troublesome even to those 
attempting it. As Marks, Craven, Simpson and Wilde put it: ‘How was it that we 
were international law’s earnest champions? Had not some of us based our work 
on the effort to knock international law off its pedestal, and expose its darker 
dimensions?’29 
 
It has recently been fashionable to construct enjoined critique and juridical attack 
on a reading of Agamben, following him in arguing that ‘the state of exception as 
the original structure in which law encompasses living beings by means of its own 
suspension emerges clearly in the “military order” issued by the president of the 
United States’ authorising indefinite detention of ‘enemy combatants’, and that 
those taken by the US under the PATRIOT Act, ‘Taliban suspects’, and above all 
Guantánamo detainees are subject to, ‘a detention that is indefinite not only in the 
temporal sense but in its very nature as well, since it is entirely removed from the 
law and from judicial oversight’.30 Such detainees are here paradigm figures of 
what Agamben terms ‘bare life’, victims of the exception that structures and 
underpins the law.31 
                                                
28 Matthew Craven, Susan Marks, Gerry Simpson, and Ralph Wilde, ‘“We Are Teachers of 
International Law”’, 17 Leiden Journal of International Law (2004) 363, at 366. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 2005), 3–4. 
31 See for example this 2004 interview: Ulrich Raulff, ‘An Interview with Giorgio Agamben’, 5 
German Law Journal (2004), 609, at 610. For ‘bare life’, see Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: 
Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford University Press: Stanford, 1998). A few of many 
 This is an ingenious approach, seeming to allow the critical IL scholar to maintain 
a radical position vis-à-vis the law tout court – which in this model is, after all, 
predicated on the violence of the exception – as well as on the specifics of post-
9/11 US actions because of the exception into which they pitch their victims. 
However, this approach to recent shifts in law has come under telling criticism. 
Fleur Johns has brilliantly shown that, far from being the ‘black box’ of 
exceptionality, the Guantánamo regime is, in fact neurotically superlegalized.32  
The Agambenite may retort that this is to hypostasise the model, that the claim is 
not that the law is statically separated into ‘juridicalized’ and ‘exceptional’ spheres 
but that the former engenders the latter ongoingly and necessarily, and the fact 
that the exceptional sphere may then fill with law (which will then generate its 
own exception, and so on) if anything underlines the central importance of that 
exception.33 There are very good reasons for scepticism about this, not least Mark 
                                                                                                                                
approaches to Guantanamo drawing on this ‘exceptionality’ include Scott Michaelson and Scott 
Cutler Shershow, ‘Beyond and Before the law at Guantánamo’, 16 Peace Review (2004), 293–303; 
Jean-Claude Paye, ‘The State of Emergency as the Empire’s Mode of Governance’, 16 Multitudes 
(2004), 179–190; Rens Van Munster, ‘The War on Terrorism: When the Exception Becomes the 
Rule’, 17 International Journal for the Semiotics of Law (2004), 141–53;  
32 Fleur Johns, ‘Guantanamo Bay and the Annihilation of the Exception’, 16 European Journal of 
International Law (2005) 613–35.  
33 This is, indeed, a criticism levelled at Judith Butler’s supposedly one-sided insufficiently 
Agambenite reading of the exceptionality of Guantánamo (Judith Butler, ‘Guantánamo Limbo’, 
The Nation, 1 April 2002. Available at: <http://www.campcampaign.info/butler-
guantanamolimbo.htm> (visited 19 April 2009)). According to Michaelson and Shershow, ‘Butler 
Neocleous’s points that the extreme elasticity of the concept of ‘emergency’, and 
the long-term and juridically explicit ‘states of emergency’ enshrined in countless 
‘un-exceptional’ juridical orders, strip that ‘exception’ of any particular analytic 
edge.34 However, even if one were to accept the model, to insist that what is 
theoretically pertinent and most politically dangerous about, say, Guantánamo, is 
its putative exceptionality, rather or more than the law that also – surely ‘just as 
also’, at a minimum – conditions it, is question-begging, indeed, ideological.  
 
In this respect, like the liberal jurisprudential attack on neoconservatism, the 
‘exceptionalist’ critique of post-9/11 US law and IL acts to exonerate IL itself 
from imperial guilt: in this model the big problem, crudely, lies where the law has 
a hole in it. Even if the exception is seen as inextricable from the law, through a 
moment of illegitimate disentangling it is somehow specifically the exception that 
is the problem, rather than the law. How much worse if Bellinger is right, that 
Guantánamo represents little more ‘typical laws of war’, and this is IL as usual?35 
                                                                                                                                
… fails to recognize that the Guantánamo prisoners are both outside and inside the normative rule 
of law’: Michaelson and Shershow, ‘Beyond’, supra note 31, at 296. 
34 Mark Neocleous, ‘The Problem with Normality: Taking Exception to “Permanent Emergency”’, 
31 Alternatives (2006), 191-213. 
35 ’When we treat a phenomenon like Guantánamo Bay as an instance of lawlessness or, in the 
widely circulating phrase, a “legal black hole”, we make it seem like a legal mystery. Well, 
Guantanamo Bay is certainly a place in which people have few rights, but it is no legal vacuum or 
mystery. Its basis in legal stipulations (constitutional law, special regulations, extradition 
arrangements) is, or should be, plain for all to see.’ Susan Marks, ‘State-Centrism, International 
Law and the Anxieties of Influence’, 19 Leiden Journal of International Law (2006) 339-47, at 347. 
 The embedded exoneration of IL36 is an exoneration of the mainstream 
liberalism/anti-neoconservatism that considers and advertises itself the defender 
of IL, and by extension of an alternative model of governance. In this way, the 
anguished insistence that this epoch has been characterised by a bleak 
international novum in which IL is being murdered operates to obscure 
continuities of imperial power: as Perry Anderson has put it, pointing out the 
‘complaisance with which Clinton’s successive aerial bombardements of Iraq were 
met’, ‘Europe in mourning for Clinton … can unite in commination of Bush’.37  
 
This nostalgia is one half of a temporal dyad, the other being aspirationalism 
about the future potential of IL – see for example Samantha Power’s fervent 
insistence that we have to ‘believe in international law’,38 or Anne-Marie 
Slaughter’s argument for ‘the future relevance, power, and potential of 
international law’.39 Implicit in mainstream liberalism’s insistence that IL – and 
                                                
36 ‘[W]e obscure the possibility that international legal norms may themselves have contributed to 
creating or sustaining the ills from which we are now to be saved. … And we weaken our capacity 
to criticize international law’. Marks, ‘State-Centrism’, ibid. 
37 Perry Anderson, ‘Casuistries of Peace and War’, London Review of Books, 6 March 2003. 
Available at <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v25/n05/ande01_.html> (visited 19 April 2009). 
38 Samantha Power, ‘Getting through these dark times’, 
<www.salon.com/news/feature/2008/02/18/samantha_power/index1.html#> (visited 6 January 
2009). 
39 Anne-Marie Slaughter and William Burke-White, ‘The Future of International Law is 
Domestic (or, The European Way of Law)’, 47 Harvard International Law Journal (2006) 328–52, 
at 330. 
hence in this model liberalism itself – lies bleeding is the claim that it only does so 
in the present: that yesterday was and tomorrow will be better.  
 
This goes some way to explaining the eagerness of much mainstream liberal IL to 
be scandalised by the rhetorical antics of the nihilists. While this has made for a 
liberal insistence that we are in a moment of total crisis, a jurisprudential death-
drive seemingly masochistically obsessed with IL’s supposed destruction and thus 
IL liberalism’s own failure, the argumentative focus on an increasingly 
marginalised and straw-man neocon ‘IL nihilism’ has not only ducked the battle 
with far more sophisticated opponents but has in fact stressed IL’s importance and 
relevance, and thus those of its liberal champions. This aggrandizement has been 
a tacit collaboration between IL’s defenders-in-mourning, and its nihilist enemies: 
in Anupam Chander’s words, ‘there was a time when the [right-wing] critics of 
international law denounced it for its irrelevance … [T]he critique has shifted. 
International law is denounced not for being feeble, useless and irrelevant but for 
being vigorous, effective, and pervasive.’40 This is precisely right, and is evident in 
the shift from Perle’s contemptuous dismissal of IL as ‘in the way’, to Rumsfeld’s 
more anxious equation of it and terrorism, and to Bolton’s fear that IL might 
breach ‘the American citadel’.41 These later iterations of IL nihilism are of 
paradoxical comfort to liberal IL.   
 
                                                
40 Anupam Chander, 114 ‘Globalization and Distrust’, Yale Law Journal (2005) 1193–236 at 1200.  
41 John Bolton, ‘The Global Prosecutors: Hunting War Criminals in the Name of Utopia’, 78 
Foreign Affairs (1999) 157–64. 
There is an elegant symbiosis. The liberal mainstream has attacked the nihilist 
neocons for gravely injuring IL, and thus stressed neoconservative power; and 
those nihilists in turn have complimented IL (and by implication its advocates) by 
denouncing it as a mortal threat. This mutually constitutive antagonistic 
grooming not only helps explain why liberal IL’s partisans so often fail to engage 
with neoconservative advocacy of IL, but why their excoriation of certain of the 
nihilists has at times been almost libidinally charged. For liberals there is a 
mediated enjoyment: the preposterous rhetorical excesses of Bolton and Rumsfeld 
have flattered them. As an American bumper sticker had it after Rumsfeld’s 
sacking in 2006, ‘I miss hating him already’.42 Quite.  
 
I have argued that, contrary to some claims, the neoconservative wing of the 
Republican administration has by no means axiomatically denigrated IL. Even the 
NIL scholars, however, in stressing the ‘Nationalism’ in IL, have underlined the 
recent dominance of a strategy of American unilateralism,43 a tendency widely 
criticised, and usually cited as part of a claim that the US administration breaks or 
                                                
42 Image available at <photos1.blogger.com/blogger2/3057/1365/1600/rumsfeld_miss.gif> (visited 
6 January 2009). 
43 For an exposition of recent right-wing unilateralist thought from an advocate, see Charles 
Krauthammer, ‘American Unilateralism’, 
<www.hillsdale.edu/news/imprimis/archive/issue.asp?year=2003&month=01> (visited 6 January 
2009). For analyses of the political conception underpinning that strategy (that avoid depoliticized 
commonplaces equating the agenda with Bush’s putative cowboy stupidity) see Callinicos, New 
Mandarins, supra note 11, and Adel Safty, ‘The Origins of the Present American Unilateralism’, 
available at <www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/3453> (visited 6 January 2009).  
destroys IL. For Sands, for example, unilateralism is so self-evidently contrary to 
the spirit of IL that it can be cited as one of several one-word-sentence critiques 
of Yoo’s doctrines, as above. In similar vein, the first point of the 2006 ASIL 
resolution, that ‘[r]esort to armed force is governed by the Charter of the United 
Nations and other international law’, insists that multilateralism and IL are 
inextricable, indispensable and, by implication, being undermined.  
 
The questions of whether and to what extent multilateralism and the IL 
associated with it have been, in fact, in crisis, and do, in fact, offer an alternative 
to the brutal realities of Iraq must therefore be investigated. 
 
 
Haiti 
 
Given the millennialism of so many of its proclamations about IL, one might have 
thought that, faced with evidence of strong countertendencies to the US IL-
nihilist unilateralism it has diagnosed as (mis-)shaping the international system, 
the liberal IL establishment might have reacted with surprise, pleasure, suspicion, 
interest, or indeed anything at all. This might seem especially appropriate if such 
countertendencies had been evident under the Republican administration, long 
predating the victory of Barack Obama in the US presidential elections.  
 
The 2006 ASIL resolution was passed two years after a large-scale, multilateral 
international action, involving UN intervention into a sovereign state, for the 
planning and prosecution of which the US closely collaborated not only with 
allies, but with nation-states with which relations were otherwise strained. All this 
occurred with the full backing of the UN Security Council. In IL terms, this 
action, in other words, was effectively the anti-Iraq.  
 
The February 2004 Haitian coup that saw the overthrow of President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide, the subsequent occupation of Haiti by US, Canadian and 
French troops, and their rapid replacement with troops of the UN MINUSTAH 
mission, has been exhaustively and desperately documented by activists and the 
alternative media. It has been followed to varying degrees, if inadequately and 
with shocking racism and misrepresentation, in the mainstream press.44 As a 
major event in the Americas, though underdiscussed, it has been the subject of 
attention – if often questionable – in political science and other disciplines.45 
However, in mainstream IL literature, the very scholarship one might expect to 
show a particular interest in such politically controversial multilateral UN action, 
the coup has barely registered. In fact at the time of writing, by any reasonable 
                                                
44 See for an overview Justin Felux, ‘Debunking the Media’s Lies about President Aristide’, at 
<www.dissidentvoice.org/Mar04/Felux0314.htm> (visited 6 January 2009). 
45 As examples of the attention and of its partisan misrepresentation of the situation, see Daniel P. 
O’Neill, ‘When to Intervene: The Haitian Dilemma’, XXIV SAIS Review (2004) 163 (which cites 
without evidence Aristide’s ‘evident authoritarianism’); and David M. Malone, ‘Peace and 
Democracy for Haiti: A UN Mission Impossible?’, 20 International Relations (2006) 153–74, at 
164 for the airy assertion that Aristide’s claim to have been ‘kidnapped’ by US forces was ‘far-
fetched’. 
standards astoundingly, not one of the top 25 IL journals has published an article 
on the coup and/or the UN mission.46  
 
Shortly after the event, ASIL published a scant and scandalously misleading 
online ‘ASIL Insight’ on the Security Council’s Resolution 1529 endorsing a UN 
force in the country, which rehearsed the standard and spurious line that ‘former 
Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, facing insurrection and public disorder, 
resigned and left the country’. 47 The same year saw one journalistic sketch in The 
Vanderbilt Journal of International Law consisting largely of platitudinous 
aspirations in the democratising potential of the Haitian judiciary (a grim joke, 
given that group’s recent history and complicity in the coup, as will be argued) 
alongside rote insinuations against Aristide.48 These two five-year-old offerings 
represent more or less the entirety of mainstream IL scholarship’s reflections on 
the Haitian coup and its bloody five-year aftermath. Nor is there any more 
attention paid in the lively IL blogosphere, even freed of some constraints and 
delays of academic publication.49 
                                                
46 Ranked in 2006 by the Washington & Lee Law Library: see Roger Alford, ‘Top International 
Law Journals’, <opiniojuris.org/2006/11/21/top-international-law-journals/> (visited 6 January 
2009).  
47 Frederic L. Kirgis, ‘Security Council Resolution on Multilateral Interim Force in Haiti’, 
<www.asil.org/insights/insigh128.htm> (visited 6 January 2009). 
48 Ben J. Scott, ‘Order in the Court: Judicial Stability and Democratic Success in Haiti’, 37 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (2004) 555. 
49 The most important IL blog, Opinio Juris, <www.opiniojuris.org>, has never mentioned the 
events. UN Dispatch has presented one anodyne ‘snapshot’ (its own term) of MINUSTAH (and 
 Since 2004 there has been little but the odd line in passing in essays on other 
topics, rehearsing propaganda such as that by some ineluctable and tragic Haitian 
logic divorced from any imperialist machinations, ‘[i]n February of 2004, Haiti 
slipped back into chaos and despair’,50 that the foreign military presence has 
meaningful Haitian government consent,51 that more than once the US ‘forced 
the dictators and their Tonton Macoute death squads out of Haiti’,52 and so forth.  
                                                                                                                                
repeated the spurious claim that Aristide ‘fled’) 
<www.undispatch.com/archives/2007/05/there_are_six_t.php> (visited 6 January 2009); 
Democracy Arsenal has made two one-line mentions of Aristide’s overthrow, once even 
mentioning in passing ‘[t]he U.S. role in helping depose Haitian President Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide’, but not to condemn it: rather to condemn South Africans for their ‘virulent animosity 
towards America’ <www.democracyarsenal.org/2005/08/bad_bad_sam.html> (visited 6 January 
2009). Of the whole of the extensive Opinio Juris blogroll, which covers all the most important IL 
blogs, only two blogs deserve credit for raising critical questions about the event (or indeed 
mentioning it for more than one line): those of legal philosopher Brian Leiter and of the lawyer 
Jeralyn Merrit, each of whom twice questions the official story 
<leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2004/03/what_exactly_is.html> (visited 6 January 2009) and 
<leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2004/03/more_worrisome_.html> (visited 6 January 2009); and 
<www.talkleft.com/story/2004/03/02/162/41286> (visited 6 January 2009) and 
<www.talkleft.com/story/2004/02/27/708/07955> (visited 6 January 2009). 
50 Kirsti Samuels, ‘UN Reform: Post-Conflict Peace-Building and Constitution-Making’, 6 
Chicago Journal of International Law (2006) 663, at 663 (emphasis added).  
51 Adam Roberts, ‘Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and Human 
Rights’, 100 American Journal of International Law (2006) 500. 
52 John Davenport, ‘The Just War Tradition and Natural Law: A Discussion: Just War Theory 
Requires a New Federation of Democratic Nations’, 28 Fordham International Law Journal (2005) 
 While the prestigious IL fora have had nothing to say about the IL of this 
situation, there have been stalwart efforts in other arenas by activist lawyers, such 
as Brian Concannon, Marjorie Cohn and Ira Kurzban (President Aristide’s 
attorney), to question the legality of the coup and occupation.53 The progressive 
National Lawyers Guild has organised two human rights delegations to the 
country, and set up a subcommittee on Haiti ‘to promote justice and sovereignty 
for the Haitian people’.54 In 2006, a group of Haitian citizens and human rights 
organisations filed a petition at the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, claiming that the coup violated IL that ‘protects citizens’ democratic 
                                                                                                                                
763, at 776–7. For an explicit attempt to equate Aristide’s supporters with Duvalierist death 
squads, see Malone, ‘Peace and Democracy’, supra note 43, at 163: ‘Aristide’s much feared militia 
supporters, the Chimères, elicited nightmare memories of the Tontons Macoutes’. 
53 See for example Brian Concannon, ‘Can the New Congress Help Uncover the Truth?’, 
<www.counterpunch.org/concannon01092007.html> (visited 6 January 2009); Marjorie Cohn, 
‘The Illegal Coup in Haiti’, <www.counterpunch.org/cohn03312004.html> (visited 6 January 
2009); and Ira Kurzban, ‘Diplomacy by Death Squad’, 
<www.counterpunch.org/kurzban05032005.html>, (visited 6 January 2009). See also the 
University of Miami School of Law’s two important investigations into human rights violations in 
Haiti since 2004: Thomas M. Griffin, Haiti: Human Rights Investigation November 11–21, 2004 
(pdf), <www.law.miami.edu/cfshr/pdf/CSHR_Report_1111-21_2004.pdf> (visited 6 January 
2009); and Anna Mance, Quinn Smith and Rebecca Yagerman, Haiti: Human Rights Investigation 
March 11–16, 2006 (pdf), <www.law.miami.edu/cfshr/pdf/CSHR_Report_0311-162006.pdf> 
(visited 6 January 2009). 
54 The subcommittee’s website is at <www.nlginternational.org/com/main.php?cid=3> (visited 6 
January 2009), from where the damning summary reports of the Human Rights Delegations can 
be accessed.  
choice of government’.55 In March 2004, the National Conference of Black 
Lawyers filed a complaint with the International Criminal Court’s prosecutor, 
requesting investigation on ‘whether charges may be brought against Bush 
Administration officials for war crimes in the kidnapping of Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide’.56 2005 saw the first session of the International Tribunal on Haiti, 
organised by a coalition of solidarity groups and activist lawyers, at which not only 
Haitian police commanding officers but leading UN and MINUSTAH 
representatives ‘were convicted of violations of Haitian law and international law 
including crimes against humanity’.57 
 
Some who share the anti-imperialist agenda of these activists, but whose 
jurisprudential perspective is one of critical legal scepticism, might be unconvinced 
about the juridical precision and/or strategic efficacy of expressing opposition to 
                                                
55 ‘On Eve of Haiti’s Elections, Haitian Citizens and Four Human Rights Groups File Petition 
against United States for Overthrowing Haiti’s Democracy in 2004 Coup D’Etat’, 
<www.ijdh.org/articles/article_iachr_BAI_IJDH_Yale_1-31-06.htm> (visited 6 January 2009). 
For more material on this petition, see 
<www.ijdh.org/articles/article_iachr_BAI_IJDH_Yale.htm> (visited 6 January 2009).  
56 The text of the complaint is at <archives.econ.utah.edu/archives/a-
list/2004w13/msg00007.htm> (visited 6 January 2009). The group claimed ICC jurisdiction on 
the grounds that though neither the US nor Haiti are parties to the Rome Statute, the Central 
African Republic, to where Aristide was taken, is. 
57 ‘Summary of the First Session of the International Tribunal on Haiti’, 
<www.lasolidarity.org/haiti.shtml> (visited 6 January 2009). Details of these prosecutions were 
passed on to the International Criminal Court, without result. 
the coup in these legal terms.58 Any such comradely disagreement and debate 
notwithstanding, however, it is trivial and self-evident that the Haitian coup raises 
key issues of IL, and therefore telling that such discussions have overwhelmingly 
had to take place in relatively marginalized grassroots, activist and alternative 
media. 
 
The silence of the ‘invisible college’ of IL with regard to this issue is damning.59 
Even absent appropriate political urgency – even if, in the face of the evidence, the 
‘official’ version of the Haitian coup is adhered to – the simple facts of the 
controversy, violence and international legal mechanisms invoked, and therefore 
issues at stake, mean that at a level of scholarly due diligence, if nothing else, this 
is a shameful omission. What lies behind this ignoring? And what does it tell us 
about IL and the system of and reasons for dominance exerted by powerful states 
over weaker – imperialism?60 
 
The details of the coup, its context and aftermath, the systematic 
misrepresentation of Aristide, Lavalas, and the 2000 elections that Lavalas 
overwhelmingly won (repeated insinuations to the contrary notwithstanding), the 
situation since 2006, and the Préval presidency are beyond the remit of this paper. 
They have been outlined elsewhere, particularly in Peter Hallward’s outstanding 
                                                
58 For my version of left IL-scepticism, see Miéville, Between, supra note 19, especially 295–320. 
59 The categorisation is Oscar Schachter’s, in ‘The Invisible College of International Lawyers’, 72 
Northwestern University Law Review (1977) 217–226. 
60 On various ‘broad’ and ‘narrow’ definitions of imperialism – never an uncontroversial category – 
and my own usage, see Miéville, Between, supra note 19, 226–30.  
and exhaustive Damming the Flood.61 Here I mention only a few salient facts and 
issues.  
 
The officially sanctioned story has it that after his initial election in 1990, the 
liberation theologist Aristide began to morph into yet another brutal tinpot 
dictator; that he was overthrown in 1991; replaced by the good graces of the US 
in 1994; degenerated even further, engaging in large-scale electoral fraud in 2000; 
until a mass movement finally overthrew him in 2004. At this point, as the ‘ASIL 
Insight’ quoted above dutifully alleges, Aristide resigned and left.  
 
                                                
61 Peter Hallward, Damming the Flood: Haiti, Aristide, and the Politics of Containment (Verso: 
London, 2007). Also see his 2004 article, ‘Option Zero in Haiti’, 27 New Left Review (2004) 23. 
Unsurprisingly, his analysis has not been without its critics. His book was savagely and lengthily 
criticized by Michael Deibert (the author of Notes on from the Last Testament: The Struggle for Haiti 
(Seven Stories: New York, 2005), a book supportive of Aristide’s overthrow), at 
<michaeldeibert.blogspot.com/2008/03/review-of-peter-hallwards-damming-flood.html> (visited 
6 January 2009). The dignified tone of Hallward’s reply, available at 
<mostlywater.org/peter_hallward_responds_michael_deibert’s_review_damming_flood> (visited 6 
January 2009), is admirable, but almost disappointing in its restraint. By comparison, one can be 
glad that Justin Podur overcame his stated reluctance to debate Deibert (whose response to Podur’s 
2006 review of his book is available at <www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/4405> (visited 6 January 
2009): the original review is Justin Podur, ‘Kofi Annan’s Haiti’, 37 New Left Review (2006)). 
Podur’s 2006 rebuttal of Deibert’s claims, at <www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/4398>, (visited 6 
January 2009), also devastatingly lays bare his ad hominem, tendentious, imperially apologetic and, 
according to at least one of his supposed informants (Patrick Elie), mendacious methodology.  
This is a risible misrepresentation. Aristide was and remains the key leader of 
Lavalas, the popular movement that arose in the 1980s and represented a 
significant threat to the power of the (US-supported) Haitian elite: a military 
coup under General Raoul Cédras in 1991 in response to Aristide’s election 
victory in 1990 left about 5,000 people dead. In 1994 Aristide, suitably 
hamstrung, or so the US and its allies thought, was allowed to return (when the 
Haitian junta became too unseemly to its sponsors). After winning a second 
election in 2000, and proving that despite the extreme financial and political 
constraints that straitjacketed him, Aristide still had unacceptable aspirations to 
shift power in Haiti somewhat towards the poor and grassroots, in 2004 he was 
forcibly expelled from his country by US marines, as the culmination of a 
sustained campaign against him and his renewed Lavalas movement by (above all) 
the US, France, Canada and Haitian domestic elites. The core of the domestic 
opposition, far from being the broad-based movement of ‘civil society’ as which it 
was represented, was a somewhat fractious alliance between old-school Duvalier-
style Macoutistes, right-wing officers who never forgave Aristide for disbanding 
the army in 1995, and sweatshop owners such as Andy Apaid (an American 
citizen and leader of the ‘Group of 184’, the International Republican Institute-
backed collective of business leaders invariably described in the mainstream media 
as a ‘grassroots initiative’). Lavalas was and remained the most popular political 
movement in the country, in large part because despite the concerted and 
unrelenting pressure of the US, France and the international financial institutions, 
and their success in insisting on neoliberal ‘reforms’, Lavalas continued to attempt 
to build what Aristide called ‘poverty with dignity’, placing what meagre bulwarks 
were possible against the total collapse of social programs and labour standards. 
Discussing Haiti as long ago as 1922, one IL scholar expressed concern that 
‘[f]ree elections in a good many countries would mean the elimination of those 
most fit to govern’, and 78 years later, so, from the US point of view, it proved.62 
 
Law, especially qua legitimation, was key to the coup. Far from representing 
‘Haiti’s most promising source of strong, domestically oriented progress’,63 much 
of the Haitian judiciary, as organised in the Haitian Judges’ association 
(ANAMAH), was a key partner in the UN overthrow of Aristide, reflecting the 
organisation’s creation with the careful planning and participation of the US and 
Canada through USAID-proxy IFES (International Federation of Electoral 
Systems), as part of a deliberate campaign of ‘sensitization’ of the judiciary to 
accentuate elite opposition to Aristide.64 After Aristide’s overthrow, ANAMAH 
made itself eminently useful to the coup regime, for example keeping awkward 
cases in legal limbo. When then-minister of justice Bernard Gousse dismissed 
Judge Jean-Sénat Fleury, who had demanded the release of an opponent of the 
Latortue government detained without evidence, not only did ANAMAH raise 
no objections, but the head of the organisation, Judge Jean Peres Paul, who had 
been active in the anti-Lavalas opposition before the coup, took over the case and 
                                                
62 Philip Marshall Brown ‘International Responsibility in Haiti and Santo Domingo’, 16 American 
Journal of International Law (1922) 433, at 434. 
63 Scott, ‘Order’, supra note 46, at 574. 
64 This is brilliantly researched and laid out in Griffin, Haiti, supra note 53. 
kept the prisoner, Father Gerard Jean-Juste, in jail.65 The pious international 
mantra of ‘judicial independence’, in other words, did not mean independence 
from those plotting a coup against a democratically elected and popular 
government.  
 
Crucially for the consideration of IL, the coup, its preparations, and the 
occupation, have been astonishingly successful exercises in multilateral diplomacy. 
The preparations for the coup were an opportunity for the US and France to put 
some of the ill-temper over Iraq behind them, as the new and old colonial powers 
worked together to orchestrate the vilification of Aristide and to plan for his 
overthrow, with the enthusiastic collaboration of Canada. The three countries 
collaborated to train right-wing paramilitary rebels in the Dominican Republic in 
preparation for the coup,66 support the anti-democratic rightwing forces that 
                                                
65 Stuart Neatby, ‘The Politics of Finger Wagging’, 
<www.zmag.org/content/print_article.cfm?itemID=10121^sectionID=1> (visited 6 January 2009); 
Brian Concannon, ‘In Haiti, the Chickens are Coming Home to Roost’, 
<www.counterpunch.org/concannon12302005.html> (visited 6 January 2009). Judge Peres Paul 
also personally ordered the arrest of two journalists investigating the harassment of Fr. Jean-Juste, 
Kevin Pina and Jean Ristil, for ‘disrespect to a magistrate’: ‘Police in Haiti Arrest Two Journalists’, 
<www.ijdh.org/articles/article_arrest_journalist_9-14-05a.htm> (visited 6 January 2009). 
66 ‘Witnesses: U.S. Special Forces Trained and Armed Haitian Anti-Aristide Paramilitaries in 
D.R.’, <www.democracynow.org/2004/4/7/witnesses_u_s_special_forces_trained> (visited 6 
January 2009). On Canada’s preparations, see Anthony Fenton and Dru Oja Ja, ‘Declassifying 
Canada in Haiti: Part I’, 
<www.dominionpaper.ca/foreign_policy/2006/04/07/declassify.html>(visited 6 January 2009), and 
would replace Lavalas, the brutal Interim Government of Haiti led by Gérard 
Latortue between 2004 and 2006, and ultimately, when massive electoral fraud 
(including ballots burnt and dumped)67 failed to halt the 2006 election to 
president of René Préval (seen by the populace as the candidate closest to Aristide 
and Lavalas), ensured that his administration would not stray from permitted 
paths. (Préval, indeed, has dutifully requested the extension of the hated 
MINUSTAH mandate.)68 
 
UN declaration 1529 was backed by the Security Council and was read out at a 
self-congratulatory press conference by John Bolton, the very anti-multilateralist 
bogeyman so denounced by IL liberals. International support was never total: 
both the African Union and Caricom, the Caribbean Community, opposed the 
coup (Caricom suspending Haiti’s membership after Aristide’s overthrow). 
However, the UN invasion has gained the active support of countries, such as 
Spain, opposed to the Iraq War, and has seen the enthusiastic collaboration of 
Latin American states in other contexts considered progressive (though notably 
not Venezuela, whose President Chavez continues to support Aristide): indeed, 
the military operation is under Brazilian leadership. The head of the UN 
                                                                                                                                
‘Declassifying Canada in Haiti: Part II’, 
<www.dominionpaper.ca/foreign_policy/2006/04/09/declassify.html> (visited 6 January 2009). 
67 See Joseph Guyler Delv, ‘Burned Ballots Inflame Haitian Election Tensions’, 
<www.commondreams.org/headlines06/0215-08.htm> (visited 6 January 2009). 
68 ‘Minustah Mandate Extended in Haiti, Recognizes Risks of Premature Withdrawal’, 
<goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-6834493/MINUSTAH-MANDATE-EXTENDED-IN-
HAITI.html> (visited 6 January 2009). 
Stabilising Mission has been Chilean, Guatemalan, and is at the time of writing 
(Hédi Annabi) Tunisian. The military force includes personnel from Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Jordan, 
Nepal, Morocco, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Spain, Sri Lanka, the US 
and Uruguay. Police and civilian personnel also include members of many African 
nations, including Benin, DR Congo, Burkina Faso, Chad, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Togo, et al, as well, importantly, as China. The lack of attention paid by the 
discipline of IL to MINUSTAH is even more astonishing given this amazingly 
successful multilateral cooperation, this rainbow nation of imperial proxy invaders.  
 
Despite racist reporting that undermines the testimony of victims,69 it is clear that 
MINUSTAH and the UN unleashed, supported, and participated in a reign of 
terror. In 2006, based on an extensive survey of households the prestigious British 
medical journal The Lancet calculated that 8000 murders and 35000 rapes had 
occurred in greater Port-au-Prince alone in the two years since the coup. For the 
murders, ‘almost half of the perpetrators [were] identified as political actors’, the 
overwhelming majority opponents of Aristide, protected and collaborated with by 
the UN, including ‘[a]rmed anti-Lavalas groups and their partisans, along with 
the HNP [Haitian National Police] and other government security forces’. UN 
troops were identified as responsible for serious abuses including violence and 
arbitrary arrest and were, besides criminals, ‘[t]he most commonly identified 
                                                
69 ITN television news on 18 January 2006, for example, reporting an injured woman telling her 
story, explained that ‘this woman insists she was shot by [UN] peacekeepers’ (emphasis mine, but 
audible in the original), as if that claim was self-evidently questionable. 
perpetrators of death threats’70 – on which threats, as will be clear, they have had 
little hesitation in acting. 
 
UN troops have justified Haitian police death-squad attacks against Lavalas 
supporters, and, in the words of a Harvard report, ‘effectively provided cover for 
the police to wage a campaign of terror’.71 The UN has also taken a more direct 
role, with what one writer has described approvingly as ‘robust raids’.72 
MINUSTAH troops have repeatedly besieged, occupied and attacked pro-Lavalas 
slums like Bel Air and Cité Soleil, in the name of ‘anti-gang’ activity, sometimes 
accompanied by Haitian police, leading to arbitrary mass arrests and many civilian 
deaths.73 Hospitals have not been spared from UN attack.74 MINUSTAH has 
                                                
70 Athena R. Kolbe and Royce Hutson, ‘Human rights abuse and other criminal violations in Port-
au-Prince, Haiti: a random survey of households’ The Lancet (2006), 
<www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/haiti/2006/0831abusesurvey.pdf> (visited 6 January 2009). 
The article is discussed by one of the authors at 
<www.democracynow.org/2006/8/31/shocking_lancet_study_8_000_murders>(visited 6 January 
2009).    
71 Harvard Law Student Advocates for Human Rights and Centre de Justiça Global, ‘Keeping the 
Peace in Haiti?’, <www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/VBOL-
6B5J5U?OpenDocument>(visited 6 January 2009); see also Reed Lindsay, ‘Police terror sweeps 
across Haiti’, The Observer, 31 October 2004. Available at 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/oct/31/theobserver> (visited 19 April 2009). 
72 Malone, ‘Peace and Democracy’, supra note 43, at 166.  
73 Isabel MacDonal, ‘DDR in Haiti: The UN’s cleansing of Bel Air ahead of elections’, 
<www.haitiaction.net/News/HIP/12_17_5/12_17_5.html> (visited 6 January 2009); ‘Haiti: New 
Attacks on Cite Soleil Residents by UN Troops’, 
fired on mass demonstrations demanding a return to democracy and protesting 
the electoral fraud committed against Preval in 2006.75 To this day MINUSTAH 
maintains a checkpoint controlling entrance and egress to Cité Soleil.  
 
MINUSTAH has also perpetrated more targeted – if hardly ‘precision’ – attacks. 
On 6 July 2005, 350 UN troops, ‘not even using Haitian proxies’,76 backed by 
helicopter and armoured vehicles, stormed Cité Soleil and as part of a massive 
assault, assassinated the immensely popular community organiser and Lavalas 
militant – ‘gang leader’ in the parlance of the Haitian business elite and the New 
York Times77 – Emmanuel Dread Wilme. The attack and its aftermath were 
                                                                                                                                
<www.haitiaction.net/News/HAC/11_28_5.html> (visited 6 January 2009); Wadner Pierre and 
Darren Ell, ‘Brutalized and Abandoned: Residents of Cite Soleil Speak Out’, 
<www.haitianalysis.com/2007/2/28/brutalized-and-abandoned-residents-of-cité-soleil-speak-out> 
(visited 6 January 2009). 
74 Aaron Lakoff, ‘The Politics of Brutality in Haiti’, 
<www.dominionpaper.ca/accounts/2006/01/21/the_politi.html> (visited 6 January 2009). 
75 Melissa McNamara, ‘Haiti Election Results Spur Violence’, 
<www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/02/13/world/main1311869.shtml> (visited 6 January 2009). 
76 Kim Ives, editor of Haiti Progres, interviewed on Between the Lines July 2005, available at 
<btlonline.org/2005/ram/ives072905.ram>, transcript at ‘U.N. Troops Accused of July 6th 
Massacre in Haiti’s Cite Soleil’, 
<www.thewe.cc/weplanet/news/americas/haiti/haiti_un_massacres_continue.htm> (visited 6 
January 2009). 
77 Walt Bogdanovich and Jenny Nordberg, ‘A Haitian Slum’s Anger Imperils Election Hopes’, 
New York Times, 29 August 2005. Available at 
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3&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=3> (visited 19 April 2009). 
caught on film, making a mockery of UN claims to be returning fire against 
‘armed bandits’:78 in fact their indiscriminate attacks led to the deaths of at least 
26 civilians including many children. On 22 December 2006, MINUSTAH again 
assaulted Cité Soleil with an ‘anti-gang’ justification (and were again caught on 
film), killing around 30 civilians, again including children.79 With such a record, 
the claim that MINUSTAH should be ‘criticized for not being aggressive enough’ 
is chilling,80 and the formulation that ‘[d]espite the arrival of more than 7,000 
United Nations peacekeepers, Haiti continues to spiral downward into chaos and 
violence’81 grotesquely backwards.82  
 
This is multilateralism as terror.  
                                                
78 Stills available at <www.haitiaction.net/News/HIP/7_13_5/out/index.htm> (visited 6 January 
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<www.haitiaction.net/News/HIP/1_29_7.html> (visited 6 January 2009). 
79 ‘UN in Haiti accused of second massacre’, 
<www.haitiaction.net/News/HIP/1_21_7/1_21_7.html>, (visited 6 January 2009). 
80 Bathsheba N. Crocker, ‘Excerpt from Mission Not Accomplished, 
<journal.georgetown.edu/72/crocker.cfm> (visited 6 January 2009). 
81 Daniel P. Erikson and Adam Minson, ‘The Caribbean: Democracy Adrift?’, 16 Journal of 
Democracy (2005) 159, at 165. Emphasis added.  
82 The hope that a focus on human-rights law might ameliorate these brutalities, that such 
‘reminds everyone that the purpose of the mission is to measurably improve the full-spectrum of 
human rights of human rights as tied to the root causes of the conflict in Haiti’ (Todd Howland, 
‘Peacekeeping and Conformity with Human Rights Law: How Minustah Falls Short in Haiti’, 13 
International Peacekeeping (2006) 462, at 469) is quite utopian. As will be argued, the purpose of 
the mission is very different.  
  
The ramifications of multilateral terror 
 
An issue of this political magnitude and controversy, informed by bread-and-
butter IL problematics such as intervention, sovereignty, the UN and 
multilateralism, that in passing undermines the given of a supposedly inexorable 
US unilateralism, should obviously be of central interest to IL scholars. Liberal 
IL’s ignoring of Haiti cannot, then, be apologised away as oversight. This no-
discussion is not an absence but an absent presence, a structuring silence in 
mainstream IL. 
 
On the foundational grounds according to which mainstream opposition to the 
Iraq War has been based – the unilateral intervention against another country’s 
sovereignty without UN Security Council Resolution backing – the Haitian coup 
against democracy is easily seen as legal. With this, though silently, the 
mainstream agrees and makes no complaint. When John Yoo, perhaps cheekily, 
mentions Haiti in passing as a situation as one where the US stops a ‘murderous 
civil war’,83 he does not risk being disagreed with by most of his fiercest critics. 
 
Two factors have underlied not just this implicit agreement, but liberalism’s 
silence about it. One has been the risk for mainstream IL in interrogating the 
                                                
83 John Yoo and Robert J Delahunty, 46 ‘Statehood and the Third Geneva Convention’, Virginia 
Journal of International Law (2005), 131. 
case. The Haiti invasion, in its cross-continental multilateralism, is best safely 
ignored lest it undermine the liberal claim to be defending a multilateralism under 
attack. Here that multilateralism is, after all, a fabulously successful strategy 
employed by the dreaded neoconservatives. If they can be multilateral too, liberal 
IL might have to ask, then what are we? This is IL’s negative silence of anxiety. 
 
The fact of the neoconservatives and the Manichean politics that have 
characterised their power has led liberals and even some radicals to construct a 
series of political binaries, and then to equate those binaries with each other. Thus 
in this discourse: 
 
Unilateralism———versus ———Multilateralism 
 
equals 
 
IL nihilism———versus———IL advocacy 
 
equals 
 
Neoconservatism———versus———Liberalism 
 
equals (in some iterations) 
 
Imperialism———versus———Anti-Imperialism 
 equals (in the crudest formulations) 
 
Republicans———versus———Democrats 
 
 
Even if one accepts a temporary heuristic use to any of those schema individually, 
none of the ‘equal’s follows. I have argued through the examples of Yoo and others 
against the equation of neoconservatism and IL nihilism: now the Haiti invasion 
of 2004 shows that multilateralism can be just as if effective an imperial strategy 
as, if not a more effective one than, unilateralism.  
 
Liberal IL may have avoided considering that, but the right is not so coy. In a 
fascinating 2004 article in the hard-right National Review – the title of which, 
‘Safety in Numbers: the Limits of Unilateralism’, makes clear the thesis – 
influential conservative writer (and ex-advisor to Thatcher) John O’Sullivan 
engages with this issue precisely through the optic of Haiti.84 
 
O’Sullivan warns that because of the potential for ‘imperial overstretch’, the US 
has worked with the international community, and that ‘global isolationism is 
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2004. Available at 
<http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Safety+in+numbers%3a+the+limits+of+unilateralism.-
a0130931877> (visited 19 April 2009). 
dead’, replaced with a ‘limited institutional multilateralism’.85 He is clear that the 
purpose of this multilateralism is to further American interests. Despite indulging 
an obligatory swagger when invoking ‘multilateral respectability’ (‘don’t laugh – it 
shuts up France and the UN General Assembly’), the substantive argument is not 
that the US is just shamming, but that it is sometimes easier – even ‘necessary’ – 
to rule multilaterally. The Haitian coup proves that such multilateralism does not 
necessarily mean only an effort at some effete, touchy-feely hegemony over hearts 
and minds, but can be manifest in the violence of shock-and-awe, as in the UN-
sponsored terror in Port-au-Prince.  
 
For scholars for whom multilateral IL is a progressive bulwark against a 
hypostasized unilateralism, this is why Haiti is difficult to engage with – it 
rebukes their project. Of course, many of those who express support for 
multilateralism would be horrified to think that the carnage of Port-au-Prince is 
what they are signing up for. But in the current context of international power, 
that is the multilateralism officially on offer. The units of such actually-existing 
multilateralism are capitalist states engaged in inevitable inter- and sub-imperialist 
rivalries and violence. As embedded in the modern international system, official 
multilateralism is not a Weltanschaung but an imperialist strategy, and one which 
can coexist with its supposed opposite, unilateralism, without much difficulty.  
                                                
85 For another argument from the right on the limitations of unilateralism, see Clyde Prestowitz, 
Rogue Nation (Basic Books: New York, 2003) and his discussion of the book at 
<www.cceia.org/resources/transcripts/972.html> (visited 6 January 2009), where he claims, 
similarly to O’Sullivan, that ‘unilateralism can have very high costs’. 
 A key problem with the ‘unilateral-versus-multilateral’ discourse is that these units 
have been evacuated of any fundamental dynamic. In reality they are not the 
drivers of state behaviour, but functions of underlying interests, with concomitant 
strategies and methodologies, and as such their iterations are liable to shift 
suddenly, as with any decent and flexible strategy. Getting at those underlying 
dynamics leads us, finally, to the second reason that the liberal IL mainstream 
does not interrogate the Haiti action: the silence is of complicity. 
 
Though explicit liberal legal engagement with the coup has been largely absent, 
where necessary, law being a ‘maze of plausibilities’,86 it has not been difficult to 
take a position contrary to the coup’s radical legal critics, and defend it. As I have 
argued, its multilateral UN-backed nature has made it legally uncontroversial, to 
the point of near-invisibility, in mainstream IL. Those few inclined to more 
explicit, fashionable legal justifications, and/or more robust liberal 
interventionism, have cited the porously bordered categories of peacekeeping, 
human rights and humanitarian intervention, and the emerging ‘new international 
norm’, that is, it is claimed, on its way to becoming part of customary IL, the 
‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P).87 (It is further evidence of the coup’s looming 
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Haiti has dropped off the R2P radar. Dozens of papers, panels, symposiums, and 
conferences seem to have studiously avoided Haiti when discussing R2P’.)88  
 
There are not only no mainstream qualms over the legality but, crucially, over the 
politics of the action, to lead to investigation or attention, let alone dissent. It is 
not that the imperialism of multilateralism is hidden. Whatever a grassroots 
‘unofficial’ invocation of multilateralism might mean – and such might perhaps 
operate on some anti-imperialist axis89 – for the liberal establishment the appeal of 
multilateralism is precisely that it is part of an imperialist strategy.  
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Anthony Fenton, ‘Haiti and the Danger of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)’, 
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89 Though inchoate, one might, for example, see a seed of some such alternative multilateralism of 
activists and progressive organisations in the Porto Allegre Haiti Declaration agreed at the World 
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coup. 
This should be entirely uncontroversial, as that establishment makes few bones 
about it. With the increasing troubles and costs of unilateralist neoconservatism – 
now that, in O’Sullivan’s words, ‘global isolationism is dead’ – a shift in emphasis 
and attention towards multilateralism has been occurring,90 and the 
multilateralist-imperialist wing of US politics is becoming more confident. I have 
argued that this phenomenon is not isolated to the Democrats. However, such an 
emphasis is less alienating to sections of that party’s base than to the Republicans’, 
and exemplary of the trend is the new assertiveness of the Truman National 
Security Project, an organisation of Democrats ‘dedicated to educating progressive 
leaders in national security’91 (of which Anne-Marie Slaughter, that leading figure 
in the anti-neoconservative IL establishment, is on the advisory board). For the 
Truman Project, multilateralism is inextricable from US imperialism, as the 
founders’ breathless paean to violence illustrates. 
 
American power was real, vast, and a force for good. We never knew the 
pain of military stalemate and the self-doubt of the Vietnam generation. 
Instead, we watched our first war on television, culminating in the first Gulf 
War’s stunningly rapid victory. That war showed us both the power of 
military force, and the broad potential of multilateralism.92  
                                                
90 See Grant T. Harris, ‘The Era of Multilateral Occupation’, 24 Berkley Journal of International 
Law (2006) 1. 
91 According to their website, <www.trumanproject.org> (visited 6 January 2009). 
92 Rachel Kleinfeld and Matthew Spence, The September 11 Generation: The National Security 
Beliefs of Voters Under 30, <trumanproject.org/training/publications/papers/the-september-11th-
generation> (visited 6 January 2009). It is notable that in this passage the problem that beset the 
 Speaking to the ASIL, Hillary Clinton was clear about the instrumentalism of 
multilateralism and IL for US imperialism, and about the non-opposition 
between unilateralism and multilateralism (while indulging in the traditional 
oversimplification of the Republicans as IL-nihilist unilateralists described above).  
 
Contrary to what many in the current administration appear to believe, 
international law and international institutions are tools that help us to 
promote and advance our interests and values, not traps that limit American 
power. … The Bush Administration has presented the American people 
with a series of false choices: force versus diplomacy, unilateralism versus 
multilateralism, and hard power versus soft. Seeing these choices as 
mutually exclusive alternatives reflects an ideologically blinkered vision of 
the world that denies America the tools and the flexibility necessary to lead 
and succeed.93  
 
In neither case is the terminology of ‘world community’ or ‘international society’ 
even used – there is no dissembling that this is multilateralism in the service of 
American ‘interests’ and ‘power’. In a discussion at the Carnegie Council in 2003, 
                                                                                                                                
‘Vietnam generation’ was their ‘self-doubt’, rather than what might reasonably have provoked it: 
the Vietnam War itself. See also the 2003 paper ‘Progressive Internationalism: A Democratic 
National Security Strategy’, published by the Progressive Policy Institute, 
<www.ppionline.org/ppi_ci.cfm?contentid=252144&subsecid=900020&knlgAreaID=450004> 
(visited 6 January 2009). 
93 In her responses to an ASIL survey, <www.asil.org/clintonsurvey.cfm> (visited 19 April 2009). 
this problematic was made clear in a question to writer and ex-Reagan advisor 
Clyde Prestowitz, when he was asked to ‘explain to Americans why a multilateral 
approach is in America’s interest, as opposed to being in the interest of the rest of 
the world’94 – a challenge he took up. Then-President-elect Obama put the case 
in its simplest form in his own response to the ASIL survey of presidential 
candidates: ‘Since the founding of our nation, the United States has championed 
international law because we benefit from it.’95 
 
Such ‘American interests and power’, however, are of course not abstract (though 
they often appear so in the realpolitikal discourses of both the right and of 
liberalism): in the modern epoch they, and the imperialism of which they are 
another way of speaking, are functions of competitive accumulation in a 
framework of capitalist states. It is not only a belief in the efficacy of this imperial 
methodology that motives the widespread, untheorised, often unspoken, and 
unproblematised mainstream support for the Haitian coup: it is also its specific 
fruits and the sectors of capital that benefit from it.   
 
Aristide’s government, though hemmed in by crushing instruments of 
international financial coercion, had put in place important social progams, that 
had, for example, substantially reduced illiteracy, and transmission rates of HIV.96 
                                                
94 See the discussion at <www.cceia.org/resources/transcripts/972.html> (visited 6 January 2009). 
Emphasis mine. 
95 In his answers to the ASIL survey, <www.asil.org/obamasurvey.cfm> (visited 6 January 2009). 
96 For these and other achievements see Laura Flynn and Robert Roth, ‘We Will Not Forget: The 
Achievements of Lavalas in Haiti’, < www.haitiaction.net/News/WWNF/2_28_5.html> (visited 6 
Unsurprisingly, such gains were immediately undermined by the post-coup 
government, which, for example, abolished the Ministry of Literacy and 
eliminated subsidies for schoolbooks. The Latortue government turned its back 
on the Lavalas administration’s efforts to crack down on tax evasion by the rich, 
instead announcing a three-year tax holiday to large businesses. Fertilizer 
subsidies for poor farmers were cut, leading to a doubling in price.97 The agenda 
of the new administration, and the basis for its domestic and international 
support, were quickly clear.  
 
Aristide had been criticized even by some of his own supporters for allowing the 
setting-up of free-trade zones favoured by sweatshops on the Dominican/Haitian 
border: he did, however, retain some collective bargaining rights for workers in 
those zones. These rights were rolled back almost immediately after the coup, and 
the minimum wage, that had been doubled in 2003 (though it had remained 
inadequate) was cut. In January 2005, worldwide textile quotas which had been in 
place since 1961 were lifted, with the end of the 10-year WTO Agreement on 
Textiles and Clothing. This had long been a cause for tremendous concern among 
textile manufacturers, particularly in the US, with ‘the expectation that there 
                                                                                                                                
January 2009). See also Stephen Lendman, ‘Before the Coup: Haiti’s Achievements under Aristide 
and Lavalas’, < towardfreedom.com/home/content/view/719/1/> (visited 6 January 2009). 
97 See Justin Felux, ‘Let Them Eat Gruel’, <www.dissidentvoice.org/May2004/Felux0527.htm> 
(visited 6 January 2009). Nikolas Barry-Shaw, ‘The Crucifixion of Haiti’, 
<www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/6137> (visited 6 January 2009). 
would be ‘a major shift in sourcing clothing and textile imports to China’.98 The 
opening up of this Haitian zone of brutalized and super-cheap labour just before 
this date (the timing, it has been claimed by some, not coincidental) was of great 
help to ‘big textile’ such as the Canadian company Gildan, which swiftly moved in 
– and whose clothes are made in Haiti by sweatshops belonging to Andy Apaid, 
leader of the Group of 184.99 
 
The brutalities of the sweatshop labour and their cost-reducing effects are of 
course not side-effect but the specific desiderata of capital, particularly US and 
Canadian capital in their newly tariff-less battles with China and other textile 
manufacturing economies. In the formulation of Lloyd Wood, spokesperson for 
the American Textile Manufacturers Institute, with the enormous weight of 
China in the industry, a ‘basketcase’ like Haiti will be competing for any textile 
work.100 In an enthusiastic if coy reference to Haiti’s poverty wages and 
devastating conditions, Gildan’s 2004 end-of-year report explained that its ‘new 
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99 On the conditions in the Apaid factories, see among other reports Andréa Schmidt, ‘Andy 
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100 Anthony Fenton, ‘Gildan Activewear’, <www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/8154> (visited 6 
January 2009). 
hubs in Dominican Republic/Haiti and Nicaragua are expected to have even lower 
cost structures than Honduras’.101 
 
This is not to say that there will be no inter-capitalist disputes on these issues. 
The US’s 2006 HOPE bill (Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership 
Encouragement – and its 2008 ‘sequel’, HOPE II),102 that with various 
qualifications allowed the duty-free export of clothes made from cheap (often 
Chinese) textiles from Haiti to the US, was unsurprisingly opposed by the 
American National Council of Textile Organizations, which understood it as a 
threat to their export of fabric to Haiti, while ‘U.S. clothing importers strongly 
support[ed] the measure’.103 This bickering was between different sectors of the 
garment industry: crudely, material producers who were sceptical of the act; versus 
sub-contracting producers of and/or dealers in finished clothes (such as Gildan), 
who, of course, supported it.  
 
The Haitian textile workforce, while massively below its 1990 high of 80,000, 
between 2006 and 2008 has continued to creep up, from 14,000 to 22,000, 
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thereby increasing the profits of the sweatshop owners and, it is claimed by the 
Act’s supporters, bringing much-needed prosperity to working Haitians. Tellingly 
and unsurprisingly, however, the HOPE act did not gain much support from 
Haitian labour unions or activists precisely because it provided no requested 
safeguards against the brutal conditions. (HOPE II eventually gained a measure 
of critical support from the Confederation of Haitian Workers, on the grounds 
that space for trade union organisation has increased somewhat under Préval, and 
that the desperate economic situation makes any jobs better than none.)104 In 
other words, debates between different sectors of the garment industry 
notwithstanding, the HOPE bill was seen as an integral part of the same process 
as that marked by the collapse of the minimum wage – foreign capital’s neoliberal 
penetration of Haiti and the rollback of Lavalas’s minimal social protections.  
 
This project represented the furthering of an agenda of transnational capital ‘in 
general’, the particular accumulation regime of privatisation and neoliberalism, 
which in the throes of the ongoing economic meltdown of 2008–9 is rapidly 
losing whatever ideological sheen it had for the developed world but is still, and 
was particularly at the time, considered appropriate for the starving.105 The sums 
involved are admittedly paltry by comparison with the revenues from Iraq, which 
was a gift to the Republican elite base, oil-capital in particular, but that very 
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(visited 6 January 2009). 
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economic ‘particularity’ of the neoconservatives has been a sore point for those 
capitalists without such access to the rewards (explaining in part why the 
Democratic candidates for the 2008 Presidential election easily garnered more 
contributions from the financial industry than their Republican opponent).106 The 
Haitian coup went a small way to redressing that, benefiting textile capital 
directly, but more generally underscoring the preferred contemporary dynamics of 
capital-in-general towards outsourcing, privatization and the race to the bottom.  
 
With Canada taking a leading role in the discussions on Haiti’s future, the 
‘Willson House process’, named after the location in which the talks started in 
2005, has featured ‘open exchanges between the private sector and donors’.107 
Furthering the neoliberal assumptions embedded in the Interim Cooperation 
Framework agreed between the World Bank, UN, and Inter-American 
Development Bank, among others, and Haiti’s Latortue administration, for the 
period 2004 to 2006, the Willson House process has put forward a model 
according to which large-scale privatization of Haitian state enterprises is a sine 
qua non of development.108 Education was chosen as a laboratory for the 
                                                
106 Janet Hook and Dan Morain, ‘Clinton, Obama are darlings of Wall Street’, LA Times, 21 
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the traditional focus on infrastructure in their development strategy’. Inter-American Dialogue 
privatisation of public services.109 The concern of the participants that the 
elections of 2006 would put in place another ‘anti-business’ government explained 
the insistence, in the official record of the inaugural meeting, that ‘it is imperative 
to act in anticipation of the elections’ – in other words, to begin a process that a 
democratically elected government could not undo.110 In 2007, the Préval 
government duly announced the privatization of Haiti’s national telephone service 
Téléco, ED’H (Electricity of Haiti), and APN, the national port authority.111  
 
The coup and post-coup political economy of Haiti have, then, been exemplary: 
they make clear that prioritizing democracy and grassroots development over the 
requirements of capital will not be permitted. This is why Aristide’s government 
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was not allowed to stand. It was the furthering of this overarching neoliberal 
agenda (currently taking a serious ideological battering) that made this a popular 
coup for most sections of American capital, and supported (if quietly) by liberals 
as well as neoconservatives.  
 
The coup and occupation have, then, been, in the mainstream, legally 
uncontroversial. The understanding that a key function of IL has always been to 
maximize profit is not a paranoia restricted to leftists, but has been proclaimed by 
some of IL’s most honoured practitioners. In a 2005 speech at Goldman Sachs 
entitled ‘The Dividends of International Justice’, Carla del Ponte, Prosecutor of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, admirably clearly 
makes the argument that ‘international justice’, in making countries safe for 
investment, brings ‘the best dividends’. With typical liberal opposition of IL and 
the Iraq war (‘The yearly cost of the Tribunal is less than one day of US military 
presence in Iraq’), she stresses to her corporate audience that ‘international justice 
is cheap’ – ‘Our [the ICTY’s] annual budget is well under 10% of Goldman Sach’s 
profit during the last quarter’ – and that capital should back IL because, she says, 
‘I can offer you high dividends for a low investment.’ 112 
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Del Ponte is quite right to point out IL’s role in capital accumulation.113 
Contrary, however, to her line that it is solely as a maintainer of ‘good governance’ 
and peace that IL performs this function, Haiti illustrates that IL can also do the 
job efficiently through the propagation of instability and the unleashing and 
legitimation of murderous violence.   
 
 
Whither the unspoken consensus? 
 
Had there been many more Haitis, that is, multilateral imperial adventures 
committed under the watch of the supposedly ‘unilateralist’ neoconservatives, the 
strategy of liberal silence might have become unsustainable: even with all the 
explanations for the inattention I have attempted to outline, there is a limit to the 
number of such global events that can go unremarked before the situation 
becomes embarrassing. Even had John McCain won the Presidential race, 
however, this would have been unlikely to become an issue: within Republican 
circles the Bellingerite wing of ‘soft’, even tentatively multilateral, 
neoconservatism was on the rise, and McCain, his spurious ‘maverick’ credentials 
neurotically asserted by supporters to distance him from Bush, would likely have 
claimed to be breaking from (heavily mythologized) neoconservatism back to 
‘traditional’, less multilaterally disinclined conservatism.  
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The new president, of course, is in fact a Democrat, who has insisted that he ‘will 
have to prioritize restoring our traditions of adherence to international legal 
regimes and norms’.114 This deliberate projection of a radical break with the past 
is pronounced – though it is not a foregone conclusion that the perception will 
also be, as a growing sense of let-down among Obama supporters (what Naomi 
Klein calls a ‘hopeover’),115 particularly with regard to his administration’s attitude 
to the law, attests.116 The strategy for the US is likely to continue to shift towards 
multilateral imperialism: in the words of one commentator, ‘what’s still going on 
in Iraq with the surge represents the past, but Haiti is the future’.117 This will be a 
rational corollary of the growing current sense among the US ruling establishment 
that, as the US National Intelligence Council put it in its recent report, ‘Global 
Trends 2025: A Transformed World’, ‘[a]lthough the United States is likely to 
                                                
114 See <www.asil.org/obamasurvey.cfm>, (visited 6 January 2009). 
115 Naomi Klein, ‘A Lexicon of Disappointment’, 
<http://www.naomiklein.org/articles/2009/04/lexicon-disappointment> (visited 19 April 2009). 
116 For an interesting comment from the right on the possible continuities between an Obama and 
a Bush administration in IL, see Eric Posner, ‘Obama and international law’, 
<volokh.com/posts/1228509500.shtml> (visited 6 January 2009). See also Bruce Fein, ‘Barrack 
Obama’s czarlike wielding of executive power’, 
<http://www.slate.com/id/2215818/pagenum/all/#p2> (visited 19 April 2009). For a liberal 
critique on such legal and IL issues, see Glenn Greenwald, ‘An emerging progressive consensus on 
Obama’s executive power and secrecy abuses’, 
<http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2009/04/13/obama/index.html> (visited 19 April 
2009).  
117 Mike Davis, ‘Models of Coming U.S. Interventions: Iraq, or Haiti?’, <www.solidarity-
us.org/node/1471> (visited 6 January 2009). 
remain the single most powerful actor, the United States’ relative strength – even 
in the military realm – will decline and US leverage will become more 
constrained’. For this reason, there will be ‘a growing demand for multilateral 
cooperation’.118 
 
With the passing of the mutually parodic ‘unilateral’ and ‘multilateral’ discourses 
of the neoconservative era, the shameful non-attention of liberal IL to this key 
international legal imperial event, this terrorist legitimacy, might plausibly remain 
more or less unnoticed. As a matter of theoretical reportage this would be a cause 
for regret, but more importantly, it might delay a salutary examination of 
theoretical nostrums among scholars for whom the illegitimacy of imperialism is 
inextricable from its supposed ‘unilateralism’ and disdain for IL.  
 
Haiti should forcefully remind us that relatively uncontroversial ‘legality’ and 
multilateralism need stand in no opposition at all to strategies of murderous 
imperial control. If, indeed, that very legality helps mute criticism, as seems to 
have been the case here, one might go further, and suggest that multilateral UN-
sanctioned imperialism is more of a threat to justice and emancipation than its 
unilateralist Rumsfeldian sibling. The only thing more oppressive than a lawless 
world might be a lawful one.   
                                                
118 Global Trends 2025: The National Intelligence Council’s 2025 Project, 
<www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2025_project.html> (visited 6 January 2009). 
